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Although until recently historians have only shown limited interest in the history of military 
advising, some attention has been devoted to the British Military Mission to the Soviet 
Union, 1941-5. Nonetheless, much of what has been written is incomplete and tends to 
concentrate on Britain’s Military Mission No. 30 within the wider context of diplomatic and 
intelligence relations with the Soviet Union.1 The most important study covering the mission 
examines its role in intelligence exchange with the Soviet military together with the United 
States Military Mission in Moscow.2 But, unfortunately, there has hitherto been no single 
attempt to provide a complete history of the British Military Mission to the Soviet Union. 
Moreover, considering the diverging judgments which have been passed on the mission in the 
available literature, our understanding of its successes, failures, and leading personalities, still 
remains confused. This is particularly so in the case of Bradley F. Smith’s study, Sharing 
Secrets with Stalin, which at times appears dismissive and patronizing towards the British 
mission, yet in some places also suggests it was fairly successful in gleaning intelligence. 
 If a number of historical question marks still surround Britain’s Military Mission No. 
30, one area in particular does not seem to have received the attention it deserves: that of 
ideology.3 A thorough examination of the documents available strongly suggests that 
ideology, and the suspicions which ideology generated, was probably the major factor 
dominating the relationship between the members of the military mission and the Russian 
military officers with whom they liaised during the course of the Great Patriotic War. There 
were, in fact, two ideologies within this relationship: on the one hand, Communism, or 
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Bolshevism as it was better known among members of the political and military elite in 
Britain; and, on the other, ‘anti-Bolshevism’, in many ways just as much an ideology as 
Communism.4 Not only did Red Army officers and Soviet officials take exception to the part 
previously played in the Allied intervention of 1919-20 by individuals with whom they were 
involved as part of wartime military cooperation,5 British officers, too, carried with them 
attitudes acquired immediately after the First World War.6 
In examining the relationship between members of a military mission and the ‘host 
officials’ with whom they cooperate, there are many factors which can be identified as 
exerting an influence on behavior. The British Military Mission to the Soviet Union had a 
number of aims and, as a component part of a broader policy to provide the country with 
military supplies, it certainly had its role to play in the war effort. However, without the 
element of ideology it is impossible to understand the officially defined goals of the mission, 
the positions adopted by the six heads of mission, the reactions of British officers and men to 
life in the USSR, and the policy disputes which arose in London over the role of the mission. 
Indeed, in any wider view of the history of military advising, it can be argued that ideology 
has been an important – yet underrated – factor which holds the potential to regulate the 
relations between a military mission and the host nation. This chapter is, therefore, as much a 
case study in the role of ideology in the activities of a military mission as it is, specifically, an 
analysis of Britain’s Military Mission No. 30 in the Soviet Union, 1941-5. 
 
I 
Important for any appreciation of British policy in relation to the military mission is quite 
obviously the general attitude of Britain’s armed services towards the Soviet Union during 
the interwar period.7 From the moment the Bolshevik revolution occurred, the military, 
together with the ruling political, diplomatic, and social elites, felt threatened by 
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Communism. The Bolshevik revolution was, though, but one head of a hydra of revolution: 
in addition to the Red threat, there was the problem of the Sinn Fein ‘revolutionaries’ in 
Ireland, and nationalist movements in India and the Middle East. These threats were on the 
one hand strategic: war at the backdoor in Ireland, the unstable situation in India, and the 
challenge of the Soviet Union to the Empire. But the ‘revolutionary movements’ of 
Bolshevism, militant Irish nationalism, and ‘Mohammedism’ all combined to generate a 
feeling of insecurity which was intensified in the early post-war years by a fear of Bolshevik 
revolution in Britain itself.8 
Not surprisingly, relations with the Soviet Union were always going to be strained, so 
that even after Germany began serious rearmament in the mid-1930s hostility towards the 
USSR remained. That the First World War had left the British Empire overextended, with too 
many military commitments, a fact which became all too obvious in the 1930s,9 further 
increased the distaste of British officers for Bolshevism. A closer look at British strategic 
planning and talks with Soviet staff officers in the period from early 1939 until the German 
invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941 makes plain just how strong this feeling was. 
 The attitude of the Chiefs of Staff towards the Soviet Union in this period was 
characterized by political hostility and considerable professional skepticism towards Russian 
military capabilities. This dismissive attitude is reflected in an intelligence summary of 
information on the Red Army of November 1939 which concluded that the ‘consensus of 
opinion is that the value of the Red Army for war remains low’.10 However, despite all the 
negative assessments, there was still fear of a possible Soviet threat to British interests in the 
Middle East.11 The full extent of this fear can be seen in a Chiefs of Staff Committee report 
for the War Cabinet dated 8 March 1940. One of the assumptions was, ‘Should Allied-Soviet 
hostilities commence... we must expect Germany to be ready to provide such military aid as 
the Soviet may be willing to accept.’ Although the final conclusions of the report rejected the 
 4 
idea that Britain could assist the early defeat of Germany through action against Russia, it 
reflected the long-standing obsession with the danger from ‘the dissemination of subversive 
propaganda and the stirring up of disorder and rebellion’ by the USSR. It also made clear the 
signatories’ (C.L.N. Newall, Dudley Pound and Edmund Ironside) worries of possible threats 
to Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and India.12 
 Following the disastrous defeat of the BEF in France in June 1940, there was no clear 
sign of a major turnaround in British military attitudes towards the Soviet Union, hardly 
surprising given that the USSR and Germany were still alliance partners, however unholy an 
alliance that may have been. The suggestion made in October 1940 by Russian officers that 
staff talks be conducted with the British did, however, lead to a positive though cautious 
response in the War Office.13 The final decision to send a military mission to the Soviet 
Union was, in fact, one to which Britain had been slowly drifting shortly before the 
Wehrmacht launched Operation Barbarossa. In response to a request by the War Cabinet to 
give ‘preliminary consideration’ to dispatching a military mission, it was agreed at the 210th 
Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting held on 13 June 1941 that ‘if a Mission or Delegation 
were sent to Russia, all three Services should be represented on it’. The Chiefs of Staff 
Committee also instructed the Joint Planning Staff and the Joint Intelligence Sub-committee 
to consider ‘the general principle of sending of a “Mission” or “Advisers” to Russia if she 
were attacked by Germany’, and also what ‘the composition and functions’ of such a mission 
would be.14 
 The report produced by the Joint Planning Staff on 19 June is a most revealing 
document. Although it was pointed out that the mission could ‘provide the Russians with the 
benefit of our experience in fighting the Germans up to date’, at the same time the ‘Russians 
would however be likely to demand information from us which it would be undesirable to 
provide.’ Even though it was generally assumed that the Germans would succeed in defeating 
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the Red Army within a relatively short period of time, it was nonetheless noted that, in the 
event of Russian resistance being ‘more prolonged than we expect’, the mission would help 
in the coordination of British and Russian strategy against Germany. Yet, enthusiasm was 
anything but overwhelming. The compilers of the report noted that, on balance, the main 
advantage would be intelligence gathering, but that they felt that the value of the mission 
would disappear ‘in the face of Russian mistrust’. This negative attitude on the part of the 
Joint Planning Staff hardly augured well for the success of the mission, which – it was 
recommended – ought to receive the title of British Liaison Mission, ‘in order to avoid 
political complications’. Nonetheless, the functions of the mission were identified with a 
good deal of pragmatism: the provision of intelligence on both Russian and German 
operations; the coordination of British and Russian strategy against the Germans; and, in the 
event of a defeat of the Red Army in the Western regions of the country, to stimulate 
resistance in the parts of the country where forces were still in existence.15 
The day after the completion of the report, the Chiefs of Staff met to consider its 
recommendations. The Chiefs ‘agreed that no further action was required until it was known 
whether the Russians would accept such a Mission’.16 The German attack on the USSR two 
days later changed the situation dramatically. The Chiefs of Staff Committee now found itself 
overtaken by events, and on 24 June had to rubberstamp the directive which led to the 
appointment of Lieutenant-General Noel Mason-MacFarlane as head of the Mission which, 
due to the urgency of this situation, was already being prepared for departure.17 
Even after the German attack, the Chiefs of Staff attitude towards a wartime alliance 
with the USSR remained dominated by their lack of faith in the ability of the Red Army, Air 
Force, and Navy to withstand the German onslaught. There is little doubt that this military 
assessment could not be so easily disentangled from their ideological distaste for 
Communism. However, even if the Germans were only to be temporarily preoccupied in the 
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Soviet Union, this still seemed worth exploiting to Britain’s advantage. Thus, the Chiefs of 
Staff saw opportunities emerging, but far less for assistance to Russia and rather more as one 
further means of supporting Britain in its fight against Germany.18 
 
II 
Noel Mason-MacFarlane’s tenure of the position of head of Military Mission No. 30 was 
probably the most turbulent of all the six heads of mission, in part due to the speed with 
which he changed his attitude towards the capacity of the USSR to resist the German 
invasion. This not only put him irrevocably on the side of the Sir Stafford Cripps, the 
controversial British ambassador in Moscow, it also laid him open to the suspicion of too 
much sympathy with the Russians. At the same time, he was placed in the difficult position of 
having to pass on Russian requests for military aid at a time when Britain was not in a 
position to provide very much. Yet, despite his own distaste for Communism, MacFarlane 
quickly developed an independence of mind and belief in the Russian cause which was most 
unwelcome in Whitehall.19 
 While doing his utmost to carry out the major tasks of the mission, MacFarlane 
rapidly reached realistic assessments of what it would be possible to achieve vis-à-vis the 
Russians, provoking sharp exchanges between himself and his superiors. On 10 July, he 
wrote in a secret cipher telegram to the War Office, ‘I am very disturbed at our insistence on 
approaching Russians at once on subject of letting us co-operate over preparations for 
demolition [of] Caucasus oil fields.’ He thought that an approach of this nature ‘would be a 
great psychological mistake’.20 He also showed some insight into Russian psychology. At the 
end of August 1941, for instance, he stated bluntly in a cipher message: ‘Under existing 
circumstances Russians will never reveal their own dispositions and intentions. Apart from 
other considerations they mistrust our security principally on account of press and B.B.C.’21 
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Particularly interesting was one response of the Chiefs of Staff to further unwelcome 
views. In a message to MacFarlane in mid-July, they noted: ‘We are disturbed at suggestion 
in your M.I.L. 11/7 that Russians are convinced we are not pulling our weight.’ There then 
followed the statement that ‘our present difficulties are largely due to Russian action in 1939 
and for last 12 months we have been fighting alone against heavy odds.’ The Chiefs of Staff 
bristled at the possibility that the Russians might make ‘quite impossible demands for action 
by us’, while the references to the only recently extinguished alliance between Germany and 
the Soviet Union showed a considerable degree of continuing ideological mistrust towards 
the USSR on the part of senior military officers.22 
Nonetheless, even though MacFarlane had become convinced within a short period 
that the Russians could hold out, this did not make his task any easier as Red Army resistance 
began to stiffen. But many of the difficulties which were experienced under his leadership 
were problems which continued throughout the duration of the war, no doubt reinforcing 
already existing anti-Communist tendencies on the part of some members of the mission. On 
the one hand, there was the constant surveillance by the Soviet security services, all of which 
made it virtually impossible to maintain any contact with the inhabitants of Moscow. By and 
large, social life was restricted to embassies and the flats or hotel rooms of other mission 
members. The Russian officers with whom the mission had contact were afflicted by the 
widespread attitude in the USSR towards foreigners: one of deep suspicion.23 According to 
the mission’s chief interpreter under MacFarlane: ‘Cooped up as we were in restricted 
surroundings, with little or no normal intercourse with local people... and often watched and 
followed by plain clothes police, the outcome would have been collective insanity had it not 
been for the indomitable spirit of Mason-Mac and one or two others.’24 
Another problem which MacFarlane faced was the unwieldy structure of the mission, 
with three separate service chiefs for the military, naval and air sections, who in some ways 
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duplicated the work of the service attachés who were also present in Moscow. At a meeting at 
the Kremlin on 30 June 1941, for example, Molotov and the Deputy Chiefs of the Red Army 
and Naval staffs received MacFarlane, Rear Admiral Geoffrey Miles and Air Vice-Marshal 
A.C. Collier, together with the service attachés.25 At the same time, the mission was split up 
geographically, with a considerable number of personnel stationed at the ports of Murmansk 
and Archangel, not all of whom were naval. There was a contingent of army and air force 
technicians who were required to assist in passing on tanks and aircraft in working condition, 
after they had been delivered by British convoys. Moreover, the Russian staffs were 
constantly making all kinds of demands for information, such as for advance lists of the 
quantity of stores and equipment which were to be delivered in each convoy; and, frequent 
objections were made to the number of British personnel serving in Russia.26 
In addition, MacFarlane’s command suffered from the evacuation of all British 
mission and embassy staff from Moscow to Kuibyshev in mid-October 1941.27 Even though 
the military mission was able to return in January 1942, the embassy staff remained stranded 
in Kuibyshev, complicating the coordination of policy between mission and embassy. Even in 
April 1942, the Foreign Office advised the British Ambassador not to put pressure on the 
Soviet Government for a return of the embassy to the capital, and to rely simply on 
‘prolonging’ the length of his visits to Moscow to keep in touch with the military mission.28 
However, for the mission a return to Moscow also meant a return to the daily frustrations of 
dealing with the Otdel, the Soviet organization responsible for liaising with the British 
officials. In fact, the nature of this daily business led MacFarlane to note in a cipher message 
of March 1942, reporting on an encouraging visit to the northern ports, that ‘the trip… 
emphasized how much easier things are when you get away from Moscow.’29 
But if MacFarlane’s visit to the northern ports had shown that the situation there was 
positive, and relations with the local Russian commanders good, the work of the British Tank 
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Detachment continued to be a source of intense irritation.30 Information obtained in early 
January 1942 by a member of the military section of the mission, Lieutenant-Colonel Hugo, 
indicated that British bren-gun carriers had already been employed for reconnaissance 
purposes in conjunction with motorcycles, and that British tanks had been contributing 
positively to the situation at the frontline.31 Yet, despite this, the Russians continued to make 
no use of British technical experts stationed at Moscow, Gorki, Archangel, and Kazan, and 
the Red Army Tank Directorate took two months to respond to a request by Mason-
MacFarlane in October 1941 for discussions. While the Russians were aware of the 
importance of British maintenance work carried out on tanks delivered to Archangel and 
Murmansk before they were sent on by rail, the workings and machinations of Soviet 
bureaucracy conspired to sabotage an effective use of the available British technical 
personnel.32 
MacFarlane’s ‘indomitable spirit’ in the face of such difficulties did, however, 
gradually undermine his position at home. At the Moscow conference in late September and 
early October 1941, he had been extremely outspoken at a meeting on 2 October between 
Lord Beaverbrook and Stanislaw Kot, General Wladyslaw Sikorski’s representative in 
Moscow. Likewise, he had to some extent been a victim of the lukewarm attitude of the 
Chiefs of Staff towards the mission. They seemed unable or unwilling to understand his 
exasperation after the mission and embassy staff had been evacuated to Kuibyshev in 
October. MacFarlane was also caught up in the disputes over policy in the Cabinet, which 
were in full swing in the wake of the Moscow conference. Above all, in late 1941 and early 
1942, the infighting in London created an atmosphere in which it was politically expedient to 
blame the head of mission for any difficulties which arose in military cooperation with the 
Russians.33 
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III 
In fact, the very discussions surrounding MacFarlane’s replacement indicated the divisions 
and confusion over British policy vis-à-vis the mission. Despite his reasonably good relations 
with the Russians in early 1942, including a long and friendly talk with Marshal Boris 
Shaposhnikov on 23 February,34 in late March the question of MacFarlane’s replacement was 
raised at a Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting after some prompting by the Foreign Office.35 
But the deliberations over his successor dragged on for so long that by the time he was 
informed on 8 May 1942 that he was to be replaced (and to be taking up an appointment as 
Governor and Commander-in-Chief Gibraltar), the question of his successor had still not 
been settled. In a final message to the War Office he reminded the Military Secretary that, 
when selecting his successor, it ought to be borne in mind that ‘the Soviet Staff are extremely 
suspicious of officers who were either in Russia during the revolutionary war period or who 
have been prominently identified with intelligence work’. After a farewell dinner given by 
officers of the mission on 15 May, he departed from Moscow Central Airport on 19 May.36 
As it turned out, Rear Admiral Geoffrey Miles, already serving in the USSR, was 
entrusted with the position of head of mission. This decision, which reversed the earlier 
intention to recall Miles before the winter of 1942, seems to have been viewed as a 
convenient, interim solution, since it meant that ‘Miles would be taking over a “running” 
show with which he was well acquainted’.37 The period of Miles’ tenure as head of mission 
can be seen as an interregnum in the history of Military Mission No. 30. In early June, Miles 
reported back to London that there seemed to be signs of an improvement in relations with 
the Soviet military, one of the rays of light being progress in cooperation with the Russian 
Tank Directorate in Moscow. However, by mid-July, there were the first signs that he was 
running up against the sort of frustrating difficulties his predecessor had encountered.38 The 
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problem was quite simply that the new head of mission lacked the initiative, dynamism, and 
insight of Mason-MacFarlane. 
Needless to say, Miles displayed the sort of mistrust of the Russians which typified 
the British personnel serving with the mission. In a telegram at the beginning of June 1942 he 
argued: ‘I can see no reason why we should continue these one sided arrangements for ever 
and give Soviet Mission [in the UK] something for nothing. It certainly does not help the 
military section here.’39 Still, it was in many ways an unfortunate time to be head of mission. 
The War Office remained jittery over anything which might rock the Anglo-Soviet boat, and 
was quick to advise Miles in July 1942 against pursuing a request to inspect Moscow’s anti-
aircraft defenses due to the ‘obvious preoccupation’ of the Russian General Staff with the 
German summer offensive.40 Nonetheless, many of Miles’ messages to Whitehall displayed a 
general sense of helplessness in the face of the difficulties he was encountering; and, he made 
frequent requests for ‘guidance’ on various issues, in particular on that most thorny of all 
problems: how to deal with Russian questions on the formation of a ‘second front’.41 
During a visit to Britain, Miles reported on 29 September 1942 to a Chiefs of Staff 
Committee meeting in Whitehall that there appeared to be a food shortage among the civilian 
population, and that he thought the Russians might ask for food supplies and oil to be sent 
with the next convoys. He also noted that Murmansk ‘had been considerably devastated by 
enemy air action’, but continued to complain about the difficulty of obtaining information 
from the Russians, even though he had been allowed to inspect the port.42 In February 1943 
he made the demand that the British Government should take ‘concerted action’ in order that 
‘Soviet information and experience’ be obtained in a timely fashion, yet justified his request 
by pointing out that the American military attaché, Brigadier-General J. A. Michela, had 
suggested he follow his policy of pursuing the issue of increased diplomatic pressure at a 
higher level. Not surprisingly, the reply from the Chiefs of Staff was extremely icy.43 
 12 
At the beginning of the following month, Miles was informed he was to be replaced, 
no doubt as a result of his hapless approach to adhering to official policy.44 Indicative of his 
lack of success was the fact that when he finally left Moscow by air on 22 March 1943, 
following the announcement on 17 March that his successor would be Lieutenant-General 
Giffard Martel, no representative of the Soviet General Staff came to the airport to see him 
off.45 
 
IV 
Martel arrived at an aerodrome near Moscow on 5 April 1943 at 7.30 a.m., and was met by 
high-ranking officers of the mission and two Red Army officers, Major-General Dubinin and 
Colonel Evstigneev.46 He had been sent to Moscow with two letters in his pocket, one from 
Churchill addressed to Stalin, the other from Alan Brooke addressed to the Chief of Staff of 
the Red Army, at that time Marshal A.V. Vasilevsky. Both letters praised Martel as a 
distinguished officer with an excellent military record.47 According to Martel, on his arrival 
in Moscow he felt that the chances of success of his mission would be slight. He asked the 
advice of members of the mission and officials on the Embassy staff and was told he would 
have to be tough with the Russians. In his own – perhaps rather exaggerated – view, he took 
this policy to heart and enjoyed some initial successes.48 Martel’s own extremely positive, 
post-war view of his performance as head of mission has been more or less discounted by 
Bradley Smith, who sees him as being too blunt and accuses him of making a series of 
mistakes.49 Is Smith correct, or did Martel actually achieve something? 
There is no doubt that during the first four months of his tenure of the post of head of 
mission that Martel enjoyed a number of successes in gaining access to information and 
senior Red Army officers. Having met Marshal Vasilevsky on 21 April, two days later he was 
granted permission to visit the frontline in the Kursk/Oriel region. During the visit, which 
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took place between 11 and 19 May, he was able to gather a considerable amount of order of 
battle material and gain impressions of the strengths and capabilities of the Red Army. Martel 
also met R. Ya. Malinovsky at the latter’s headquarters. After Malinovsky had explained the 
situation at the front with the aid of a large map, Martel demanded in an outraged tone that 
the Russian dispositions, which were covered by a piece of paper, be revealed to him. The 
Red Army commander was taken aback, but then pulled the piece of paper aside. According 
to Martel, this confrontation led directly to the full cooperation of the Red Army in his tour of 
the front line; and, he achieved a number of other successes shortly afterwards in gaining 
access to the Russian General Staff.50 
 Throughout his time as head of mission, Martel did prove to be extremely effective in 
the way in which he collated military information, processed it, and passed it back to London. 
Periodic reports which summarized experiences and important information attest to his 
professional and energetic approach. What is interesting is that his pronounced anti-
Communist attitude did not interfere with his military judgment when it came to making use 
of the intelligence and general impressions which he gathered from conversations and 
meetings. One field in particular illustrates Martel’s professionalism better than any other: 
that of armored warfare. In June 1943, for instance, he compiled an insightful report on the 
organization and methods of the Russian armored forces, based on observations gathered 
during his visit to the front the previous month, and a long discussion with the head of the 
Red Army Tank Directorate in Moscow on 15 June. In September 1943, he sent a report 
drawing lessons from the Russian front for future Allied operations in Europe on the basis 
that the experience in Russia would be more relevant than that of the British in North 
Africa.51 
Moreover, he showed that he was perfectly capable of being insubordinate. As a result 
of comments made in his ‘Report No. 3 from the British Military Mission to the U.S.S.R.’, 
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the Chiefs of Staff Committee communicated the strong objection which the Foreign Office 
had taken towards criticisms by Martel of their ministry. After a largely implausible 
explanation about certain ‘shortcomings’ not being attributable to officials in the Foreign 
Office, the letter closed with the recommendation that in future ‘you will... ensure that any 
criticism you may have to make in future reports are more impartially distributed.’52 
However, and as later correspondence made abundantly clear,53 Martel was not mistaken in 
attributing to the Foreign Office what he saw as a policy of ‘appeasement’ towards the 
Russian military authorities. 
At the beginning of September, in a report which summarized information gained 
from ‘long discussions with the General Staff at Moscow’ in July and August, Martel was 
still fairly optimistic. Although he noted that it would be necessary to take a firm line when 
the Russians were being ‘particularly tiresome’, he pointed out at the same time that 
problems in ‘domestic relations’ (visas, difficulties over mail, and the treatment of British 
personnel arrested by the Russian authorities) had been no fault of the Russian military, who 
had in fact been helpful ‘at all times’ in such matters.54 The War Office also seemed satisfied. 
At the end of June, the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff (VCIGS) had written to 
Martel stating that there was ‘no doubt that during the short time you have been there you 
have been able to get us an enormous amount of information’.55 ‘Pug’ Ismay wrote him a 
personal letter towards the end of September 1943, commenting that, ‘I like your reports and 
appreciations of the Russian situation so much and feel that, despite your misgivings, you are 
doing a grand job of work.’56 Furthermore, in an estimate of the information supplied by 
Martel between July and October made by M.I.3 in the War Office the conclusion was 
reached that ‘there has been a very satisfactory flow of information’.57 
 By the end of September 1943, however, Martel felt that relations with the Russians 
were beginning to turn sour. Partly a result of the effects of a clash between Martel and the 
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new head of the Air Section (appointed in June 1943), Air Marshal Sir John Babbington,58 
the deterioration may well also have been exacerbated by frustration caused by decisions 
made in Whitehall. As a result of the progressive worsening in relations between the mission 
and the Soviet authorities in the final months of the year, opinion in Whitehall began to turn 
against the head of mission. Still, this was as much due to pressure being exerted by the 
Foreign Office as it was to the War Office’s dissatisfaction.59 Hence, considering the 
evidence, Bradley Smith’s view of Martel’s leadership as inept seems misplaced. For 
instance, Martel had sent clear and perceptive warnings of the necessity of reducing the size 
of mission as early as May 1943, stating in one cipher telegram: ‘Am investigating possible 
reductions in size of mission. Russians dislike large missions. Undesirable to force an 
increase on Russians at moment when they are co-operating well.’60 
Towards the end of 1943, Martel was becoming increasingly frustrated at the 
uncooperative attitude of the Russian military, not least of all due to his wish to gather 
information on German Army methods before the invasion of northern Europe. Since his visit 
to the front-line in May there had been no further opportunity to witness active operations. He 
found it particularly galling that in the second half of the year, the Soviet Military Mission in 
London had made sixty visits to see units and bases of the British Army, Navy and Air Force, 
and over 100 visits to armament factories, while a Russian general had been able to observe 
British combat operations in Italy.61 In January 1944, Martel continued his pressure on the 
Chiefs of Staff in order that he be allowed to adopt a tougher line. He sent a request to this 
effect to the VCIGS on 12 January; a similar request ‘suggesting a firmer attitude’ was sent 
on 25 January. On 28 January, the CIGS sent a message to Moscow that he was to be 
recalled. Martel left the Soviet Union just over a week later by air on 7 February 1944.62 
The recall had obviously been discussed in advance; a letter of 10 January 1944 from 
Martel to the VCIGS makes clear that the former was aware that he was to be leaving the 
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USSR shortly. His recall – which he may well have deliberately set out to provoke – seems to 
have been due to his constant demands for greater firmness and the feeling that he was not 
being allowed to take the strong stand he felt necessary. But it was certainly not due to the 
depression which tended to grip other members of the mission. In his letter of 10 January to 
the VCIGS, he wrote that he was ‘keeping fit and boxing and can so far take on any of the 
youngsters here. One has to do something like this to counteract the depressing influence of 
dealing all day with these astonishing Bolsheviks.’63 
Back in London, Martel made plain to the military authorities in Whitehall, not least 
of all the Chiefs of Staff Committee, that the position of the mission could only be improved 
if it were instructed to take a firm line, were supported by ‘the authorities in this country’, 
and by exerting pressure on the Soviet Military Mission in London. He pointed to recent 
American successes as proof of his point of view, as well as noting that his own experience 
had shown that ‘The Russian does not resent plain truthful speech. He despises the 
bootlicking methods which we sometimes employ.’64 While these views represented the 
thinking of many senior British officers, no one had stated them before, or did so later, quite 
as bluntly as Lieutenant-General Giffard Martel. 
 
V 
Well over a week after Martel’s departure, the War Office informed the British Ambassador 
in Moscow of the appointment of Lieutenant-General Brocas Burrows as new head of the 
military mission; he subsequently arrived in Moscow on 30 March 1944.65 Until Bradley F. 
Smith’s study, Burrows only appearance on the historiographical stage was a brief walk-on 
part during the Moscow conference of October 1944.66 In fact, he is portrayed by Smith in his 
study of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation with the Soviet Union as a virtual cliché of 
an anti-Communist British general. Specifically, he notes how Burrows insisted on being 
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presented to Stalin wearing medals which he had earned during the Allied intervention in the 
Russian Civil War. Still, the references he makes to Burrows’ period as head of mission are 
rather inconclusive. On the one hand, he notes that ‘Burrows got off to an especially rocky 
start regarding intelligence-sharing matters’, but, on the other, that certain aspects of British 
intelligence relations with their host counterparts ‘were warmer during the spring and 
summer of 1944 than they had been in the chilly winter atmosphere of 1943-4.’67 To what 
extent, then, did Burrows fit the ideological role model provided by his predecessor Martel? 
Of considerable interest is an assessment by him of the attitude of the Soviet 
leadership towards its Western Allies before his first month in Moscow had been completed – 
in other words, before he had really had time to assess the situation properly. Burrows 
thought that the Soviet government had been active in trying to prevent close cooperation 
between the Soviet military forces and their Western Allies because ‘a close comparison 
would display all too soon the bareness of the Soviet military cupboard’. For Burrows, the 
over-confidence of Soviet military commanders was due to the fact that they knew nothing 
about the capabilities of the armed forces of their allies, this being mainly due to the activities 
of the secret police. He was also of the opinion that without ‘Allied supplies of all types’ the 
Red Army would have been unable to have resisted the German invasion. He ended his 
communication by warning that the Soviet authorities were now nervous about the second 
front, and likely to try and downplay its significance. Burrows’ memorandum reveals a great 
deal about his anti-Soviet attitudes, and is interesting for the way in which he looked forward 
mainly to the post-war portrayal of the military achievements of the Allies, rather than 
current operations, going as far as to recommend a press campaign in the wake of the landing 
in Europe which would highlight the anticipated Anglo-American achievements.68 
As in the case of other high-ranking British officers, this negative assessment of 
Soviet military capabilities seems to have been dominated, and more probably driven, by a 
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strong anti-Communist political stance. It can be ascertained from Alan Brooke’s diary that 
Burrows was in a negative frame of mind before he even set off for Moscow. According to 
the entry for 17 February 1944: ‘After lunch I had an interview with Brocas Burrows who is 
off to Moscow... and found that the Foreign Office had been briefing him on such a 
conciliatory basis that he did not imagine he was to get anything back out of the Russians.’69 
This attitude does not seem to have changed much during the course of Burrows 
command of the mission. Further evidence can be seen in his reactions towards a suggestion 
which began to receive attention at the beginning of July 1944. On being informed by Major-
General John R. Deane, head of the United States’ Military Mission, that Stalin had told W. 
Averell Harriman, the American ambassador, ‘he thought the time had arrived to form in 
Moscow a military committee to coordinate matters of military importance concerning the 
Allies’, Burrows sent a cipher telegram to generals Hastings Ismay and John Alexander 
Sinclair asking whether they agreed in principle. Burrows himself saw in the idea a way of 
rescuing the British Military Mission from its impasse, commenting that ‘it is vital that this 
combined staff should be formed in Moscow’.70 The reaction of the Chiefs of Staff was, 
predictably, one of suspicion. Sir Charles Portal suggested that both Deane and Burrows 
should visit London to discuss the idea further, while it was agreed that Burrows should not 
commit the chiefs to the functions of the proposed committee.71 
By the beginning of August, Burrows was back in Britain for consultations with the 
Chiefs of Staff. He submitted a very revealing paper – which was read by the VCIGS, 
Lieutenant-General Archibald Nye – dealing with the issue of the proposed combined 
committee, and still seemed at this stage convinced of its potential value. Although he went 
on to complain about the lack of cooperative attitude on the part of the Soviet military, he 
explained this as being partly due to the lack of centralization in their battlefield intelligence 
system. His disapproval of the Foreign Office policy was made plain in the statement: ‘In my 
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opinion there is only a very remote possibility that the Military Mission in MOSCOW will be 
allowed any access to the Red Army at any level if the present policy of complete 
appeasement continues.’ The message was an old one: the lack of freedom to bargain was 
interpreted by the Russians as weakness and put the mission in an impossible position.72 It is 
clear from the wording of this memorandum that a political stance had taken precedence over 
military analysis. 
On 2 August 1944, Burrows attended a Chiefs of Staff meeting at which the idea of 
the combined committee was discussed, but the chiefs remained unenthusiastic. Alan Brooke 
noted afterwards in his diary, ‘I feel that it is highly unlikely that Stalin will ever agree to any 
such organization being established.’73 A further meeting took place on 16 August, at which 
Burrows referred to the combined committee as ‘an opportunity’, yet at the same time warned 
that he thought the Russians would try to use it to obtain advance information on Anglo-
American plans. Two days later, in a communication to Washington, the Chiefs of Staff 
stated that they were ‘wholly opposed to the creation of a United Chiefs of Staff 
Committee.’74 With that, the idea was effectively killed, even though the Foreign Office 
continued to pursue it long after it had become clear that it was stillborn.75 
On his return to Moscow, in addition to the usual and frustrating wrangles over the 
exchange of intelligence material, in particular order of battle details, Burrows seems to have 
performed reasonably competently when it came to the general management of intelligence 
exchange. Bradley Smith is unable to reach a conclusion as to whether Burrows’ tenure of the 
position was ineffective due to the general’s own failings, or because of the incoherence of 
official British policy. While he was dealt a poor hand, Burrows does though appear to have 
rubbed the Russians up the wrong way, and the most obvious contributory factor was clearly 
his openly anti-Communist attitude.76 Moreover, as Burrows probably foresaw, the failure of 
the Combined Committee ended his attempt to rejuvenate the work of the mission. On 18 
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October 1944, it was announced on the BBC that he had been appointed Commander-in-
Chief West Africa. On 25 and 29 October he paid two final visits to General Kutuzov, and 
then departed from Moscow on 1 November.77 
 
VI 
The final phase of the British Military Mission in Moscow can best be described as 
lackluster. Following the departure of Burrows, the head of the naval section, Admiral E.R. 
Archer, took over as chief of mission. His period in office can be viewed as decidedly 
uneventful.78 It was fitting for the continuing impromptu nature of British policy that 
Whitehall decided three days before VE-Day that the status of the mission could be enhanced 
if a higher ranking officer were to become its head. Thus, Lieutenant-General J.A.G. 
Gammell was sent to replace Admiral Archer, but not in time to attend the formal surrender 
ceremony organized by the Red Army in Berlin.79 In fact, as the ever fewer and more laconic 
entries in the war diary indicate, in the final months of the war the mission ceased to hold any 
of its previous significance. At the beginning of May 1945, one of Admiral Archer’s last 
dispatches noted that relations with the Russians had deteriorated considerably in the 
preceding weeks.80 
 On 1 August 1945, the Chiefs of Staff informed Gammell how to react should the 
Soviet Union declare war on Japan. In particular he was instructed to show a willingness to 
provide intelligence on enemy forces in areas under the command responsibility of the Chiefs 
of Staff, although he was to refrain from volunteering material on British equipment, or ‘our 
own intentions, distribution or Order of Battle’.81 But as the first Cold War frost began to 
form, the last head of Military Mission No. 30 could only watch as Anglo-Soviet relations 
began to seize up, even before the final defeat of Japan. It seems cruelly symbolic that the 
war diary of the mission contains no entries for the penultimate month of its presence in the 
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Soviet Union.82 At some point towards the end of September 1945, Gammell left Moscow, 
finally ending the existence of the mission in the USSR.83 
The last six months of the mission had made plain that latterly it had become 
effectively irrelevant to the conduct of the war in the East. Still, despite all the frustrations of 
the six heads of mission, there seems little doubt that certain successes were achieved in the 
exchange of intelligence, especially details on order of battle and German equipment. 
Likewise, one cannot underestimate the contribution of the mission to managing the arrival 
and maintenance of vital British supplies, including tanks and aircraft. The uneasy 
intelligence cooperation did though obviously favor the Russians, who showed – other than 
during fairly brief periods – little desire to reciprocate. However, since Britain’s aim in mid-
1941 had been to keep the Red Army in the field fighting the Germans, then one of the 
central goals surrounding the dispatch of the mission was achieved. But the question under 
consideration here is less, ‘Was the mission a success?’, and much more, ‘What role did 
ideology play in the work of Britain’s Military Mission No. 30?’ 
One of the most important observations which can be made is that there was a clear 
correlation between a strong anti-Communist conviction and a negative perception of the 
fighting abilities of the Red Army. This is clearly noticeable in the decision making of the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee in 1941.84 In many cases, anti-Communist attitudes led to 
completely unrealistic ideas as to how the British Military Mission should become involved 
in the war in the East, the suggestion that mission members should assist the Russians in the 
demolition of the Caucasian oil fields being one glaring example. Moreover, it is interesting 
to note that the two heads of mission who came to the most realistic and positive assessment 
of the fighting abilities of the Soviet forces, Mason-MacFarlane and Martel, made a clear 
differentiation between ordinary Soviet citizens, and also Russian officers and men at the 
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front, and those Soviet state and military officials whose main job appeared to be obstruction 
and surveillance.85 
Essentially, the influence of ideology led to a three-cornered fight in British policy-
making circles in relation to the military mission. On the one hand, the Foreign Office tended 
to play down the mission’s difficulties in favor of nurturing ‘good relations’ with the Soviet 
Union. Not surprisingly, this led to clashes not only between the Foreign and War Offices, 
but also between the Chiefs of Staff and the heads of mission – after all, the chiefs could 
hardly ignore the instructions of the War Cabinet. Yet, this was not the only cause of friction 
between the Chiefs of Staff and the heads of mission. The ideological influence on the chiefs’ 
view of the situation in Russia caused intense disputes between them and the two most 
competent heads of mission, MacFarlane and Martel. Although these two generals were 
certainly anti-Communist, their military professionalism led them to a pragmatic attitude 
when dealing with Soviet state and military authorities. Instead of the suspicious, mistrusting 
anti-Communism of the early interwar period, which certainly survived in the War Office 
during the war, they reached an appreciation of what made Soviet officials and the Soviet 
system tick. The very different post-war careers of MacFarlane, who in 1945 was elected as a 
Labour Member of Parliament,86 and Martel, who became one of the most prominent military 
Cold War publicists,87 cannot detract from the quite similar views which they held about the 
Soviet Union as a result of their war-time experiences. 
Thus, it can be argued that ideology can seriously distort the perspective of the 
situation of a military mission as seen from the decision making center at home. Senior 
military officers of average ability appointed to serve as head of mission (men such as Miles 
and Burrows) are likely to be affected by any prevalent ideological leanings in the armed 
forces. However, senior officers with a certain flair for independent thought (such as 
MacFarlane), or the assessment of foreign military capabilities (such as Martel), are capable 
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of putting aside their ideological predispositions and reaching sound assessments of the 
capabilities of the host nation’s armed forces and the best approach to military collaboration 
with them. In short, managing the effects of ideology, and selecting officers with the ability 
to work against prevailing ideological attitudes, can decisively influence the effectiveness of 
a military mission. In the case of the British Military Mission to the USSR, the impact and 
effects of ideology on decision making were never seriously addressed, so that the mission 
was never able to achieve its full potential. 
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